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BANKS AND BANKING-ESTABLISHING PREFERRED CLAIMS AGAINST INSOLV-
ENT BANK.-A bank president received drafts for deposit, with knowledge
of the insolvency of his institution. These drafts were sent to the drawee
for credit, which was later used to pay debts of the insolvent bank. Suit
was instituted by the depositQr to establish a preferred claim against the
assets in the hands of the receiver. Judgment was for the plaintiff. Held,
on appeal, that preference be denied, on the ground that the credit re-
ceived for the drafts had been used to pay the debts of the insolvent bank
and therefore was not traced into the custody of the rceiver. Austin v.
Lacey, 2 S. W. (2d) 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
Preferences in situations similar to the instant case are permitted only
when (1) facts giving rise to a fiduciary relationship are shown; (2)
the bank's assets are augmented by the property asserted to be the basis
for the claim; and (3) the assets are traced into the custody of the re-
ceiver. See Andrew v. State Bank, 217 N. W. 250, 253 (Iowa, 1928). A
showing that the officers who received the funds knew that the bank was
hopelessly insolvent meets the first requirement Board of Supervisors v.
Prince-Edward Lumber Co. Bank, 138 Va. 333, 121 S. E. 903 (1924);
Andrew v. Marshalltown State Bank, 216 N. W. 723 (Iowa, 1927) ; of. May
v. Bank of Hughesville, 291 S. W. 170 (Mo. App. 1927). The assets of the
bank are clearly augmented when it has received currency or specie.
Andrew v. State Bank of Omaha, 215 N. W. 728 (Iowa, 1927). And where
items drawn on other banks or parties have been reduced to cash or credit.
Webb v. O'Geary, 145 Va. 356, 133 S. E. 568 (1926); In re Linn Co. Bank,
1 S. W. (2d) 206 (Mo. App. 1928). But cf. NyssaArcadia Drainage Dist.
v. First Natl Bank, 3 F. (2d) 648 (D. Or. 1925) (adverse balance when
checks cleared with drawee bank). Whether the receipt of a check drawn
on the insolvent bank itself constitutes an augmentation has been the
subject of conflicting decisions. A number of recent cases hold that it does.
Leach v. Farmers Savings Bank, 216 N, W. 748 (Iowa, 1927); Kansas
Flour Mills v. New State Bank, 256 Pac. 43 (Okla. 1926). But ef. Andrew
v. Farmers State Bank, 212 N. W. 124 (Iowa, 1927). The Federal courts
usually hold contra. Mechanics and Metals Nat'l Bank v. Buchanan, 12
F. (2d) 891 (C.C.A. 8th, 1926); Nyssa-Arecadia Drainage Dist. v. First
Nat'l Bank, supra. But cf. Ellerbe v. Studebaker Corp., 21 F. (2d) 993
(C. C. A. 4th, 1927). See (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 682, 685. The fund
is ordinarily traced to the receiver if the cash in vault received by him was
sufficient to meet the claim. Kansas Flour Mills v. New State Bank, supra.
But cf. Andrew v. State Bank of Omaha, supra (preference only for low-
est cash balance between receipt and receivership). Tracing is sometimes
facilitated by presumptions that shift the burden to the receiver. City of
New Hampton v. Leach, 201 Iowa 316, 207 N. W. 348 (1926). To impress
other assets with the trust, plaintiffs lroperty must be specifically traced
therein. Farmers Bank v. Bailey, 297 S. W. 938 (Ky. 1927); Loan & Sav-
ings Bank v. Puerifoy, 139 S. E. 783 (S. C. 1927) (items sent to corres-
pondent for credit paid to receiver) ; ef. Rankin v. Banking Corp., 77 Mont.
134, 251 Pac. 151 (1926). Proof that it was used to pay debts of the in-
solvent bank is not enough. That is ordinarily considered proof of dissipa-
tion. U. S. Nat'l Bank v. Stanrod & Co., 42 Idaho 711, 248 Pac. 16 (1926);
Leach v. Sanborn State Bank, 212 N. W. 694 (Iowa, 1927). In a recent
case the court granted a preferred claim against the general assets, even
E 1150 J
CASE NOTES
though it was shown that the cash in vault was insufficient, and that the
funds had been used to pay the insolvent bank's indebtedness. Ccntral
Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 N. W. 302 (Neb. 1927). That is a
radical departure from the usual view, and although the ratio payable to
the general creditors on liquidation would otherwise have been increased
at the expense of the defrauded plaintiff, the court perhaps went too far
in allowing a preferred claim payable out of all the assets, including real
estate. It is submitted, however, that the orthodox result reached by the
court in the instant case is, if anything, less desirable. The trust idea as
a basis for decision in such cases is difficult to apply, provokes much un-
necessary litigation, and is largely fortuitous in result. Rules of prefer-
ence, probably intermediate the strict trust view of the instant case and
the view adopted by the Nebraska case, might well be established by
legislation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DELEGATION o LEGISL.ATIVE PowvEn-FxMsmL-
TAnRwF.-By the "flexible provision" of the Tariff Act of 1922 E42 Stat. 941
(1922), U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 5S41 c. 19], the President, after
an investigation and with the advice of the Tariff Commission, was author-
ized to determine and proclaim alterations in rates of duty necessary to
equalize foreign and domestic costs of production. The rate on barium
oxide was increased and the plaintiff importing company paid the higher
rate under protest and sued to recover, contesting the validity of the "flex-
ible provision" as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Hed,
on certiorari to Court of Customs Appeals, that the provision was valid.
J. W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. T. 1927, No. 242.
The problem of the extent to which legislative power may be delegated
to administrative officers and boards resolves itself into a consideration of
the limits within which, in view of the increasing complexity of subject-
matter, legislative bodies can practicably determine administrative duties
without impairing the efficient execution of a statute and without imposing
too detailed a task on themselves. Tntstees of Saratoga Sprzgs v. Sara-
toga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908) (commission
empowered to fix gas and electric rates). Some courts apply the narrow
and conservative rule that the statute must be complete in all its terms
and must leave nothing to the judgment of the administrative body. State
v. Fowler, 114 So. 435 (Fla. 1927) (attempt to delegate power to make
regulations for plumbing); Snow v. Riggs, 172 Ark. S35, 290 S. W. 591
(1927) (regulations by highway commission as to pedestrian traffic). Other
courts, by designating such exercise of discretion the formulation of "sub-
stantive law," as distinguished from "quasi-legislative" rules, reach a simi-
lar result. Compton v. Alabama Power Co., 115 So. 46 (Ala. 1927) (at-
tempted regulation by Public Service Commission of contractual liability
of public utilities). But where the courts recognize that the legislature has
defined the general policy as far as is reasonably possible, and has left to
the administrative body only the adaptation of such policy to varying local
conditions or to peculiar exigencies with which the latter is better equipped
to deal, the legislation is held valid. MleKinley v. United State.-, 249 U. S.
397, 39 Sup. Ct. 324 (1919); United States v. Grimazd, 220 U. S. 50C,
31 Sup. Ct. 480 (1911); United States v. Chonical Foundation,
272 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 1 (1926) (disposition of enemy property);
People v. Hawkinson, 324 Ill. 285, 155 N. E. 318 (1927) (qualification of
medical schools); State v. Foutch, 295 S. W. 469 (Tenn. 1927) (granting
pharmacy licenses in towns under 500). Thus, the efficient administration
of public health laws necessitates a certain amount of local discretionary
regulation. See Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Blass. 598, 600, 66 N. E. 607, COS
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(1903); Tobey, Public Health Law (1926) 50, 99. Fish and game statutes
are likewise peculiarly dependent on administrative discretion. Vail v.
Seaborg, 120 Wash. 126, 207 Pac. 15 (1922). So also in industrial fields
where contact with local conditions is requisite. State v. Lange Canning
Co., 164 Wis. 228, 157 N. W. 777 (1916) (regulation of hours and work-
ing conditions of women employees); Motter v. Derby Oil Co., 16 F. (2d)
717 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (determination of reasonable rate for pipe-line
transportation); St. Louis & F. Ry. v. United States, 22 F. (2d) 980 (D.
Mo. 1927) (enforcement of "recapture clause"' by Interstate Commerce
Commission). In the instant decision, the power granted to the President
is not mandatory and leaves to his interpretation facts which are admittedly
unsusceptible of accurate determination. (1927) 36 YALE LAw JOUnNAL
573; (1927) 13 VA. L. REV. 206. As such, it would seem a recognition by
the Court that Congress' had dictated its intent as far as was feasible,
and had left to the Executive details which could be more efficiently ad-
ministered by him.
CONTRACTS-UNLATERAL MISTAKE--NEGLIGENcE---RESCISSON.-The plain-
tiff brought an action for breach against building contractors, who, on the
same day the contract was signed, discovered their error in adding items
of their estimate and notified the plaintiff. Judgment was for the defend-
ants, the contract to be "cancelled." Held, on appeal, that the judgment
be affirmed on the ground that it would be inequitable to permit the plain-
tiff, who "had good reason to believe that a substantial error had been
made," to take advantage of the error while the contract was still execu-
tory, the contractors not being guilty of "culpable negligence." Geremia
v. Boyarsky, 140 Atl. 749 (Conn. 1928).
It is usually held that a substantial unilateral mistake will not excuse
performance and be ground for rescission if the mistake is negligent. Stein-
meyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 80 N. E. 564 (1907); Grymes v. Sanders,
93 U. S. 55 (1876); 3 Williston, Contracts (1920) § 1596. The courts
differ as to what constitutes negligence. Cf. St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp,
135 Minn. 115, 160 N. W. 500 (1916) (on similar facts with the instant
case and with Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, supra, the court found no negli-
gence). But the element of negligence is rarely decisive. 2 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918) § 856. Theoretically, under the "sub-
jective" theory of contracts negligence should not affect the question of
the "meeting of minds." Cf. St. Nicholas Church v. Kropp, supra; see
Fehlberg v. Cosine, 16 R. I. 162, 163, 13 Atl. 110, 111 (1888). And under
a strictly "objective" theory negligence should also be immaterial, for
mistake would be one of the "risks of the bargain." Cf. Steinmeyer v.
Schroeppel, supra; Brown v. Levy, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 389, 69 S. W. 255
(1902); see Note (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rav. 60, 61. Conceivably, if the
conduct of the other party is in all respects proper, the contractor's lack of
care may be material. But cancellation being an equitable procedure the
equities of the situation will actually often tend to override the question
of the contractor's negligence. Cf. Board of School Comm'irs v. Bender, 36
Ind. App. 164, 72 N. E. 154 (1905) (contractor misinformed as to time
for entering his bid, hence mistake due to hurry, not negligence); Dzuris
v. Pierce, 216 Mass. 132, 103 N. E. 296 (1913) (mistake in contract to
exchange land induced by illiteracy and misrepresentation by double
agency); see Moffett H. & C. Co. v. Rochester, 91 Fed. 28, 32 (C. C. A. 2d,
1898), rev'd on other grounds, 178 U. S. 373, 20 Sup. Ct. 957 (1900)
(relief is to be granted where the contract is "so oppressive as to be un-
conscionable"). Thus, if the other party is aware of the contractor's mis-
take and so acts in bad faith in demanding enforcement, the contract will
be cancelled. Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 152 N. W. 835 (1915) ; R. 0.
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Brornagin & Co. -. City of Bloomington, 234 fIl. 114, 84 N. E. 700 (190S).
The same is true where, as in the instant case, the other party had "good
reason to believe" an error had been made. Crosby v. Avdrcws, 61 Fla.
554, 55 So. 57 (1911). In the instant case the defendant's negligence should
not be, and apparently is not, decisive because of the suspicion of bad faith
on the part of the plaintiff.
CoRPoRATIoNs-MoTzoN ron APPOINTMENT OF APPRAsERs TO ArPln ms
VALuE OF SnAREs.-The petitioner owned shares in the defendant corpora-
tion, which were preferred as to dividends and capital distribution over
the common shares. The defendant, with the necessary consent of two-
thirds of its shareholders, filed a certificate with the state amending its
articles of association so as to create two more classes of shares which
were to be preferred over those of the petitioner both as to dividends and
capital distribution. Section 38 (11) of the New York Stock Corporation
Law provides that "if the certificate alters the preferential rights of any
outstanding shares" any holder of such shares not voting in favor of such
alteration may within a prescribed time object and demand an appraisal of
his shares and payment of their value. Petitioner's motion for an appraisal
was denied on the ground that the creation of new prior preference shares
was not an alteration of the petitioner's "preferential rights" such as
would entitle him to an appraisal under the statute; that is, his relative
position with respect to existing shareholders was not changed, although
it did operate to alter the "preferences" of his shares in the new capital
structure of the corporation. Held, on appeal (three judges dissentivg with
an opinion), that the judgment be affirmed. Dresser v. Donner Steel Co.,
247 N. Y. 37 (1928).
In the absence of authority to the contrary in the original articles of
association, a corporation was not privileged at common law to create
shares with preferences over those already created, without the unanimous
consent of all the shareholders. Ernst v. Elmira Municipal Improvcmcnt
Co., 24 Misc. 583, 54 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Sup. Ct. 1898) (action to enjoin
creation of preferred shares by dissenting common shareholder); Kxz-
ville R. R. v. City of Knoxville, 98 Tenn. 1, 37 S. W. 883 (1896) (bill by
corporation to obtain specific performance of subscription contract. Sub-
scriber to original common shares could not be forced to take subsequently
authorized preferred shares); of. Ratland R. R. v. Thrall, 35 Vt. 536 (1863)
(action to recover unpaid assessments from subscriber for common shares;
no defense that preferred shares were subsequently authorized, where pur-
pose was to borrow and raise money). Such courts may, however, ascribe
'laches" to the dissenting shareholders as a bar to their interference with
the creation of the preferred shares. Kc72t 1. Q,.cksilVCr Mini ,'g Co.,
78 N. Y. 159 (1879) (action to enjoin creation of preferred shares by
dissenting common shareholder denied when plaintiff waited four years
before suing, although the creation of the shares was open and notorious,
and further where the rights of innocent third parties had intervened).
Moreover, statutes have so modified this common law rule as to permit a
majority or a certain percentage of the shareholders affected to author-
ize such preferred shares. Hinckley v. Sckwarzschild Co., 107 App. Div.
470, 95 N. Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dept. 1905), aff'd 193 N. Y. 599, S N. E.
1125 (1908) (consent of two thirds sufficient); Gczcral Inrestmnt Co. v.
Americwn Hide & Leather Co, 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 At. 244 (1925)
(same). But cf. Born v. Beasley, 145 Tenn. 64, 235 S. W. 62 (1921) (same).
Such statutes included no provision for protecting the dissenting share-
holders, although the changes usually resulted in some decrease in the
value of his shares. General Investment Co. v,. Amnrican Hide & Lcathcr
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Co., supra. But in only two jurisdictions are there statutes designed to
protect a dissenting shareholder upon a change in the value or character
of his "preferential rights" as a shareholder. N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill,
1923) c. 60, § 38 (11) ; see Ohio Corporation Act (1927) cited in Ballantine,
Corporations (1927) 894. The instant case is the first and only decision
interpreting such a statute. It is submitted that the sole purpose of this
type of statute is to give protection to the dissenting shareholder, and that
the court in the instant case defeated the purpose of the statute by engaging
in technical refinements of the meanings of "preferences" and "preferential
rights." See Note (1925) 11 CORN. L. Q. 78, 81.
CouRTs-DSBARMNT-AMBuLANCE CHASING.-The Bar Association of
Brooklyn petitioned the court to investigate into the alleged prevalent prac-
tices of ambulance chasing and to exercise its disciplinary power to correct
this abuse. Held, that the court has the power to direct a judicial In-
quiry into corrupt practices of attorneys though no specific charges are
made and no individual accused, the investigation to proceed through
private hearings. In Te Brooklyn Bar Ass'n., 223 App. Div. 149, 227 N. Y.
Supp. 666 (2d Dept. 1928).
The power of the court to "discipline attorneys is inherent and incidental
to the discharge of its judicial functions. See Wolfe's Disbarment, 288
Pa. 331, 334 (1927); In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492, 653, 89 N. E. 39,
84 (1909). This power is not derived from the legislature. See Ludens
v. Harris, 273 Ill. 413, 422, 112 N. E. 978, 982 (1916). And it has been
held not to be subject to statutory limitation. See In re Bailey, 248 Pac.
29, 31 (Ariz. 1926). But see Danford v. Superior Ct. of California, 49 Cal.
App. 303, 305, 193 Pac. 272, 273 (1920) (power to disbar an attorney is
purely statutory). Some courts, however, will recognize reasonable regula-
tions prescribed by the legislature, in so far as the legislation does not
encroach on the rights of the court. In re Olmstead, 140 Atl. 634 (Pa.
1928); Green, Courts' Power over Admission and Disbarment (1925) 4
TEX. L. REV. 1; see Higgins v. Burton, 64 Utah 562, 564, 232 Pac. 914,
915 (1924); In re Application for License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va.
213, 218, 67 S. E. 597, 599 (1910). The exercise of this disciplinary power
has neen confined, almost wholly, to the trial or investigation of specific
charges against individual attorneys. A general investigation by the court
into certain prevailing practices of misconduct was first authorized in
a recenb Wisconsin case. Rubin v. State, 216 N. W. 513 (Wis. 1927).
This was followed by a similar investigation order in New York. In ro
Association of Bar of City of New York, 227 N. Y. Supp. (App. Div. 1st
Dep't 1928)'; (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 438. The only possible objections
to these decisions are that they entail public hearings and a power to
subpcena indiscriminately, with the resulting danger to the reputation of
an innocent party summoned merely, on suspicion and forced to testify.
The instant case, in providing for private hearings, would appear to dis-
pose of the objections and still provide adequate means for combating a
prevalent evil.
EQUITY-TRADE SECRETS-DUTY OF NON-DISCLOSURE IMIPOSED BY FIDUCI-
ARY RELATION.-The plaintiff, executor, seeks to enjoin the defendant from
using or divulging secret medical formulm learned during employment with
deceased. Judgment was for the plaintiff. Held, on appeal, that the judg.
ment be affirmed on the ground that the originator of medical formulm
has such "right" in them as will enable him to prevent their use or din-
closure by an ex-employee. Glass v. Klottwitz, 297 S. W. 573 (Tex. 1927).
Equity will generally protect as a trade secret any secret plan, proces,
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tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those to wbom
it is necessary to confide it for its proper utilization. See National Tube Co.
-v. Eastern Tube Co., 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. 468, 470 (1902). In any case an injunc-
tion will not issue in the absence of proper proof of the actual secrecy of
the knowledge in question. Cf. Newark Cleaning & Dye Works v. Gross,
97 N. J. Eq. 406, 128 AtL 789 (1925) (names and addresses of patrons
known to all); Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Lange, 20 F. (2d) 801 (C. C. A.
3d, 1927); Victor Chemicad Works v. Iliff, 299 IMI. 532, 132 N. E. 800
(1921) (information available in published literature). A limited publica-
tion, in absence of circumstances amounting to abandonment, does not dis-
pense with the secret character of the knowledge. Germo Mfg. Co. v.
Coombs, 240 S. W. 872 (Mo. 1922) (list, but not proportion of ingredients
printed on the label); Pressed Steel Car Co. v). Standard Steel Car Co.,
210 Pa. 464, 60 Atl. 4. (1904) (blue prints sent with orders for convenience
of buyers); Radium Remedies Co. v. Weis, 217 N. W. 339 (Minn. 1928)
("partial secrecy"). Courts have refused to recognize the names of laundry
route patrons as a "trade secret." El Dorado Laundry Co. -r. Ford., 294 S.
W. 393 (Ark. 1928). Names and addresses of such customers, however, have
been protected as "good will" in which the owner has "property." Colonial
Laundries Inc. v. Henry, 138 Atl. 47 (R. I. 1927). Many courts grant
relief in situations similar to that of the instant case on the basis of
the "property right" theory. See (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 439. Moro
modern decisions, however, in the absence of an express contract, place
the protection afforded on the basis of a contract implied in law from
a confidential relationship between the parties. But there are diverse
views as to what constitutes the necessary "confidential relationship:'
Westervelt v. National Paper & Supply Co., 154 Ind. 673, 57 N. E. 552
(1900) (ex-employee); Vulcan Dctizning Co. v. Amerian Can Co., 72 N.
J. Eq. 387, 67 AUt. 339 (1907) (ex-director) ; Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y.
30, 2a N. E. 12 (1889) (repairman); King v. Gannon, 158 N. E. 340
(Mass. 1927) (no confidential relationship where machine shop owner
copied designs of machine built in his shop by another). See (1927) 12
CORN. L. Q. 502. On either the "property right ' or "implied contract"
theory the courts are really protecting a party against bad faith and
breach of confidence on the part of the defendant, and the absence of
these elements will preclude recovery.
EIDENcE--ADmAIssiBnIIT OF UNCOMMUNICATED REPUTATION OF DECEASED
IN HOMICIDE CASES WHERE ISSUE IS SELP DEFENSE.-The defendant was
on trial for murder. Under a plea of self-defense he offered the deceased's
reputation for violence, though uncommunicated to him, for the purpose of
showing that the deceased was the aggressor. Held, on appeal, that this
evidence was properly excluded. State v. Padida, 138 At. 450 (Conn. 1927).
Communicated reputation is admissible on the issue of self defense to
show that the defendant acted reasonably in defending himself. Common-
wealth v. Tircinski, 189 Mass. 257, 75 N. E. 261 (1905); State -i.. Wilson,
41 Idaho 616, 243 Pac. 359 (1926). Communicated threats are admissible
to show the defendant's belief that he was acting in self defense and also
as evidence that the deceased was probably the aggressor. State v. Smith,
164 Mo. 567, 65 S. W. 270 (1901); People v. Dunn, 233 Micb. 185, 206
N. W. 568 (1925). Uncommunicated threats are admissible, not to show
the defendant's state of mind, but that the deceased was probably the
aggressor. Campbell v. People, 16 Ill. 17 (1854); People r. Swigart, 251
Pac. 343 (Cal. 1926); (1921) 34 HARV. L. REv. 675. These uncommunicated
threats are not usually admitted as character evidence, but come in to show
the deceased's intent in order to show the probability that be carried it
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out. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285, 12 Sup. Ct. 909 (1892);
1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) § 111. There seems to be some con-
flict as to the admissibility of uncommunicated reputation of the deceased
to show that the defendant was the aggressor. State v. Mclausland, 82
W. Va. 525, 96 S. E. 938 (1918) (admissible); People v. Lamar, 148 Cal. 164,
83 Pac. 993 (1906) (admissible); Commonwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275,
146 N. E. 700 (1925) (inadmissible); 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923)
§ 63. The court in the instant case held the evidence inadmissible because
if a violent disposition is to be given probative value in determining who
was the aggressor the prosecution should have the same opportunity to
use this type of evidence as the defense; but since the prosecution cannot
offer the defendant's reputation for violence until he has put his character
in issue the defendant should not be permitted to show the deceased's
violent disposition. Cf. People v. Rodawald, 177 N. Y. 408, 70 N. E. 1
(1904). Though the court in the instant case undoubtedly reached a do-
sirable result on the facts, the view expounded seems legalistically unsound.
In many jurisdictions the prosecution can offer the deceased's reputation
for peace and quiet when the issue of self defense is raised even though
the defendant has not first introduced the deceased's reputation for vio-
lence. Thrawley v. State, 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95 (1899). Contra: State
v. Reed, 250 Mo. 379, 157 S. W. 316 (1913). The prosecution can always
introduce the deceased's peaceable character if the defendant is allowed to
introduce the deceased's reputation for violence. Commonwealth v. Cas-
tellana, 277 Pa. 117, 121 Atl. 50 (1923) ; (1923) 71 U. PA. L. Rv. 394. As a
practical matter, however, this evidence seems to be of too little value to
merit the consideration of the court.
EVIDENCE-PEDIGEE AS EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE-RLATIONStIP oF
DECLARANT-A claimant, desiring to reach the estate of an intestate, of-
fered as evidence the declarations of a first cousin, of the same family
name, that claimant was the sister of deceased's father and so next of kin.
The lower court refused to admit the evidence. Held, on appeal, that the
judgment for the defendant be reversed since the relationship to the claim.
ant having been made out, the declaration was admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule without independent proof that the declarant was re-
lated to the deceased's branch of the family. Shea v. Hyde, 140 Atl. 480
(Conn. 1928).
In the matters of pedigree the relationship of tha declarant to the family
must be established by extrinsic evidence. 3 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed.
1923) § 1490. Ambiguity as to the meaning of the word "family" has
given rise to two lines of cases. In one, independent evidence .of declar-
ant's relationship with both claimant's and deceased's branch of the family
is necessary. Aalholm v. People, 211 N. Y. 406, 105 N. E. 647, L. R. A,
1915 D. 215, annotation. In the other, relationship of declarant with either
branch is sufficient. Sitler v. Gehr, 105 Pa. 577 (1884); 3 Wigmore, op,
cit. supra, § 1491. The strict rule applies particularly where the claimant
seeks to establish relationship through affinity. Aalholm v. People, supra.
But it sometimes prevails where relationship is through blood. Pete v.
Farren, 129 Atl. 238 (Del. 1924) (declarations introduced to show declar-
ant was a first cousin of deceased's family). Contra: Overby v. Johnston,
42 Tex. Civ. App. 348, 94 S. W. 131 (1906); see Castor v. MeDole, 80 Ind.
App. 556, 569, 137 N. E. 889, 893 (1923). On the other hand, where the
claimant alleges that he is a blood relation of the ancestor, declarant's
relationship with either claimant or family of deceased is sufficient. In
re Black's Estate, 30 Wyo. 55, 216 Pac. 1059 (1923) (declarant the proven
grandmother of claimant, court admitted declaration that deceased was her
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brother). And even when the issue is one of pedigree through affinity,
declarant's relationship need be shown independently to one branch of the
family only. In re McDade's Estate, 95 Okla. 120, 213 Pac. 532 (1923) ; In
re Colbert's Estate, 51 Mont. 455, 153 Pac. 1022 (1915) (under code re-
quiring relationship in the family to be proven before admitting declara-
tion). If the identity of the person spoken of in the declaration is in doubt,
however, declarant's relationship with both branches must be shown. Com-
rwwnwealttv . Sweeny, 283 Pa. 520, 129 Atl. 577 (1925). One writer states
the general rule correctly that relationship with both branches need not
be proven unless the claimant is seeking property. 4 Chamberlayne, Evi-
dence (1911) § 2933; ef. Conyer v. Burckhaltcr, 275 S. W. 606 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925). It has been suggested that Aalholm u. People, supra, would
shift the trend of American authority toward the stricter rule. (1914)
28 HARv. L. REV. 107. But this has not been the case. In re Black's Ea-
tate, supra; Castor v. McDole, supra; In re McDade's Estate, supra; In rc
Colbert's Estate, supra; L. R. A. 1915 D. 215, annotation. In some cases,
the requirement of independent proof of the relationship of the declarant
with the families of both the deceased and the claimant vould seem to
nullify all advantage of the pedigree rule, for under this restriction, the
declaration would be mere surplusage. (1906) 20 HARe. L. Puy. 142; 36
L. R. A. (N. s.) 530 (1912) annotation; cf. Aalhobn v. People, supra.
Moreover, since only slight evidence of relationship is required, identity in
the family name of the declarant and the deceased, as in the instant
case, is sufficient. Sitler v. Gehr, supra; cf. F&dM:ersowi v. Holmes, 117
U. S. 389, 6 Sup. Ct. 780 (1886) (only slight outside evidence of dual
relationship required). In view of the difficulty of proving pedigree in
many cases it would seem best to admit relevant declarations of any per-
son related to either claimant or deceased and allow the tribunal to attach
such weight to it as the circumstances warrant.
EXECUTORS AND ADmINISTRATORS-IGHT TO A REFUND OF OVERPA'IIE=T
TO CREDIr6ns OR LEGATEEEs-The plaintiff, receiver of an insolvent estate,
filed a bill in equity alleging that the executrix had paid certain debts
owed to the defendant under the mistaken belief that the estate was solvent,
and sought to compel a refund of the excess over the pro rata share. Tha
defendant demurred. Held, on appeal, that the order overruling the de-
murrer be affirmed. Chestertoum Banlk of Maryland v. Perkins, 140 Atl.
834 (Md. 1928).
The prevailing view supports a refund to the executor or administrator
on facts similar to those of the instant case. Wolf v. Bcaird, 123 Ill. 585,
15 N. E. 161 (1888); Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn. 320, 22 At. 313 (1890);
Woodruff u. Claflin, 198 N. Y. 470, 91 N. E. 1103 (1910); 3 Woerner, Tho
American Law of Administration (3d ed. 1923) 1797. Contra: Frizdlay v.
Triggs Adm'r, 83 Va. 539, 3 S. E. 142 (1387) (assets remaining insufficient
to satisfy preferred creditors). There is less certainty where the executor
or administrator attempts to recover a payment made to a legatee or dis-
tributee. The common practice is to require a refunding bond, in which
case no question arises. Where a legacy or distributive share is voluntarily
paid and the assets later prove insufficient to pay a debt of which there
was no notice at the time of payment, it is usually held that the personal
representative may recover enough to pay the debt. Cliftoin v. Clifton, 54
Fla. 535, 45 So. 458 (1907); McClung v. Slcg, 54 W. Va. 467, 46 S. E. 210
(1903). It is sometimes said that the plaintiff must show that he acted
with due care in ascertaining the claims before making payment. See
Warren, Problems in Probate and Administration (1918) 32 HAnv. L. Rny.
315, 332-337. The better view would seem to be that such negligence should
1157
YALE LAW JOURNAL
not bar recovery unless the defendant is prejudiced thereby. Mansfield
v. Lynch, supra; Warren, op. cit. supra. If the executor or administrator
has wasted the assets, thus causing the deficiency, he cannot recover. See
Clark v. Truslow, 146 N. Y. Supp. 750, 752, 161 App. Iiv. 675, 678 (2d
Dept. 1914). Where the assets prove insufficient to pay unpaid legacies the
prevailing view is that a legatee who has received only that to which he
was entitled under the will is under no duty to refund any part. 3 Woer-
ner, op. cit. supra 1902; Warren, op. cit. supra 332-337. But a residuary
legatee may be under such a duty. Clark -. Truslow, supra. If because
of a mistake of fact a legatee has received more than he is entitled to,
the executor may recover the excess. Stokes v. Goodykoontz, 126 Ind. 535,
26 N. E. 391 (1891). In most jurisdictions there can be no recovery if pay-,
ment is made under a mistake of law to one not entitled thereto. Phillips
v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N. E. 445 (1898); Scott -. Ford, 52 Or. 288,
97 Pac. 99 (1908). Contra: Culbreath. v. Culbreath, 7 Ga. 54 (1849). See
Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn. 320, 326, 22 Atl. 313, 315 (1890). The same
distinction is applied to payments to creditors. Thorsen v. Hoopcr, 57 Or.
75, 109 Pac. 388 (1910). The court in the instant case took jurisdiction
on the ground that there was no remedy at law. But actions at law for
money had and received have been allowed. Morris v. Porter, 87 Me. 510,
33 Atl. 15 (1895). It is well settled, however, that equity will take juris-
diction in these cases. Von Lingen v. Field, 141 At. 390 (Md. 1928);
Clifton v. Clifton, supra. This may be due to historical reasons. The
explanation suggested in the instant case is that the equity courts ar4
better fitted to handle the problem.
HABsAs CORPUS-SCOPF-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT.-The petitioner was
committed for contempt for his failure to obey a decree ordering the pay-
meit of an agreed sum of money. While an appeal was pending, he sued
out a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was being held in violation
of the Pennsylvania statute against imprisonment for debt. Held, that
the facts constituted imprisonment for debt under the statute, and the
petitioner should be released (one judge dissenting on the grounds that
habeas corpus was not the proper remedy since the committing court had
jurisdiction). Commonwealth 'v. Heston, 140 Atl. 533 (Pa. 1928).
The theory uniformly asserted is that habeas corpus provides a collateral
attack and hence inquires only into the jurisdiction of the committing court.
1 Bailey, Habeas Corpus (1913) §§ 30, 71. Some courts, consequently,
have limited themselves to the questions of whether the committing court
had the parties properly before it, and had general power to act in that
class of case. Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (U. S. 1822); see William-
son's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 17, 29 (1855). This seems to be the view adopted by
the dissenting judge in the instant case. Supra at 536. But most courts
have permitted a broader scope of review. This has been accomplished,
not by rejecting the theory" that only jurisdiction could be reviewed, but
by defining jurisdiction to include "power to render the particular judg-
ment." 1 Thompson, Trials (1889) § 145; see People v. Hackley, 24 N. Y.
174, 78 (1861). It seems clear that under such a definition there can be
no logical distinction between a "merely erroneous" decision and a judg-
ment "void. for want of jurisdiction," and that the courts in contempt
cases are actually granting relief by habeas corpus wherever the error
of the committing court seems sufficiently gross. See MeLemore, Review
of Contempt Proceedings by Habeas Corpus (1912) 74 CENT. L. J. 152.
Thus a release was obtained by habeas corpus where the facts stated were
held not to amount to a contempt. Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 39
Sup. Ct. 337 (1919); Ex parte Gordan, 92 Cal. 478, 28 Pac. 489 (1891);
1158
CASE NOTES
In re Dill, 32 Kan. 668 (1884); Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135 (1677). And
where the order violated was held to have been improper. Holman v. Mayor
of Austin, 34 Tex. 668 (1870); Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604 (1881).
In cases raising the question of imprisonment for debt, while the more
usual procedure has been to appeal, there is some authority for allow-
ing the habeas corpus remedy. Scote v. The Jailer, 1 Grant. Cas. 237
(Pa. 1855); Ex parte Gerrish, 42 Tem. Cr. 114, 57 S. W. 1123 (1900);
In re Jararnillo, 8 N. M. 598, 45 Pac. 1110 (1896); Coughlin v. Ehdert,
39 Mo. 285 (1866). The obvious advantage of the instant decision is the
speedy relief which it affords to a prisoner entitled to an cventual dis-
charge. This would seem to outweigh the procedural disadvantagez re-
sulting from allowing a collateral attack upon an adjudicated question.
INSURANcE-DESTRUCTION OF VESSEL BrORE ISSUNCE OF Porc-. The
plaintiff chartered his vessel to another, who agreed to insure it. The
charterer's agent in another city applied to the defendant for marine in-
surance covering the vessel "lost or not lost," and the next day, a few
hours after the vessel was sunk, the policy was issued. The plaintiff, after
being informed of the loss, made several unsuccessful efforts to get into
communication with the charterer to ascertain from what company the in-
surance was obtained. In a suit on the policy, the court directed a verdict
for the defendant. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be reversed, since
even though the plaintiff had knowledge of the loss prior to the writing
of the policy, if his agent negotiating the insurance had no such knowledge,
and the plaintiff is guilty of no lack of diligence, the plaintiff can recover.
Pendergast v. The Globe & Rutgers Fire Insttrance Co., 246 N. Y. 396
(1927).
It is the general rule of marine insurance that the applicant must disclose
all material facts known to him, and those which, under all the circum-
stances of the case, ought to be known to him. Ionidee -. Fender, L. 1. 9 Q.
B. 531 (1874) ; Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U. S. 485, 1 Sup.
Ct. 582 (1882) ; Vance, Insurance (1904) 251. And where the agent of the
applicant has failed to use reasonable diligence to disclose any material
fact to his principal, the policy will be void, though the principal has acted
in good faith. Prondfoot v. Montifiore, L. R. 2 Q. B. 511 (1867); Watson
v. Delafield, 2 Caines 223 (N. Y. 1804); Gladstone v. King, 1 D1. & S. 35
(1813). But the agent must be under a duty to disclose such information
to his principal in the ordinary course of business. Blackburn, Lowv & Co.
v. Vigors, 12 App. Cas. 531 (1887). And the agency relation need not
extend to the insurance itself to impute his knowledge of the loss to his
principal. Proudfoot v. Montifore, supra; Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 Term.
R. 12 (1785) (insured's shipping agent); Gladstone v. King, stpre (master
of insurer's vessel). Contra: General Int. Ins. Co. v. Rvggles, 12 Wheat.
408 (U. S. 1827) (master of insured's vessel). This rule does not require
the insured to use all possible means, but only all reasonable means of as-
certaining the condition of his property. Neptune In . Co. V. Robinson, 11
Gill. & J. 256 (Md. 1840). The same rule applies to the insured's agent.
Wake v. Attorney, 4 Taunt. 493 (1812). It is generally held that the use(
of means available in the ordinary course of business constitutes reasonable
diligence. Proudfoot v. Montifore, mspra (failure to use telegraph voided
the policy); Snow v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 160 (13741) (failure to
use cable, when the cable was not in general use, did not void the policy).
What constitutes reasonable diligence has been held to be a question of
fact for the jury. MeLanahan v. Univarsl Ins. Co., 1 Pet. 170 (U. S.
1828); Green v. Mer. Ins. Co., 10 Pick. 402 (Mass. 1830). On facts similar
to those in the instant case, the complaint of the plaintiff was held to have
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been erroneously dismissed. McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., supra. The
instant case qualifies the general rule to this extent, that the non-disclosure
of a material fact, unknown to the insured's agent applying for insurance,
does not avoid the policy issued, even though such fact is actually known
to the insured, provided the insured has been guilty of no lack of diligence
in communicating such information to his agent.
INSURANCE-SUBROGATION OF INSURER TO CLAIMS OF INSURED.-The de-
fendant company was operating a water system under contract with the
city by which it agreed to furnish a certain supply of water and other
facilities for extinguishing fires. Certain premises were destroyed by fire.
The insurance companies paid the loss. The owner of the premises, a tax-
payer of the city, suing for the insurance companies, and the companies
themselves brought action against the defendant, alleging that the loss was
due to the defendant's failure to comply with the provisions of its contract
with the city. Held, on appeal, that a demurrer to the petition was properly
sustained. Burford & Co. v. Glasgow Water Co., 2 S. W. (2d) 1027 (Ky.
1928).
It is well settled in Kentucky that an individual tax payer may recover
in an action against the water company for fire loss due to breach of the
company's contract. Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co.,
-89 Ky. 340, 12 S. W. 554 (1889); Harlan Water Co. v. Carter, 220 Ky. 493,
295 S. W. 426 (1927). But when an insurance company has paid part of
such loss, the insured can recover only the remainder from the water com-
pany. Georgetown Water Co. v. Neale, 137 Ky. 197, 125 S. W. 293 (1910).
In most jurisdictions the right of the citizen to recover either in contract or
in tort is denied, unless the contract expressly imposes such liability upon
the water company. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co.,
226 U. S. 220, 33 Sup. Ct. 32 (1912); H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N. E. 896 (1928) ; Prindle v. Sharon Water Co., 105
Conn. 151, 134 Atl. 807 (1926). This view is followed even in those states
where the right of a donee-beneficiary to sue upon a contract intended for
his benefit is generally recognized. The probable explanation is the fear
of imposing an unreasonable burden upon the water companies. See H. R.
Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., supra at 168, 159 N. E. at 898.
Conceding that the defendant was responsible to the insured it is difficult
to reconcile the instant case with the authorities. The general rule is that
when an insurer pays to the insured the amount of the loss, it is subrogated,
in a corresponding amount, to any right of action for the loss that the
insured may have against third persons. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. D.
380 (1883); Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Engineering Works Co.,
184 Fed. 426 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911); 5 Joyce, Insurance (2d ed. 1918) 5580.
As fire insurance is a contract of indemnity, the loss as between thef
contracting parties falls on the insurer, its responsibility being limited to
the loss actually sustained. See Castellain v. Preston, supra at 386. Where
the insured sues in his own name he recovers as trustee for the insurer,
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 166 U. S. 468, 17 Sup. Ct. 619
(1897). The right to subrogation has been upheld in one of the other
jurisdictions adopting the view that the insured may sue the water com-
pany in a case identical with the present one. Powell and Powell v. Wake
Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916). It is evident that the
court in the instant case felt that to recognize the right to subrogation
would be to impose an intolerable burden upon the water companies. Per-
haps the most desirable method of avoiding this result would be to adopt
the prevailing view denying the citizens' right against the water company.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW-WAR-EFFECT ON ALIEN PaorTsr.-After the dec-
laration of war but before sequestration legislation was passed, two Ger-
man subjects transferred their certificates for shares of an American rail-
road to the plaintiffs, who were subjects and residents of the Netherlands.
Seizure of these shares was subsequently effected on the books of the com-
pany under the Trading with the Enemy Act of Oct. 6, 1917, § 7 (b) [40
Stat. 411 (1917), U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1919) § 31151i d.] which pro-
vided that transactions constituting "trade with the enemy" which had been
illegal, remained so and were prohibited under penalty. Plaintiff's bill,
seeking recognition as a shareholder, was dismissed on the ground that the
transfer was ineffective as against the subsequent seizure. Held, on appeal,
that the degree be affirmed. Schrijvcr v. Sutherland, 19 F. (2d) 038 (D.
C. 1927) ert. denied, 48 Sup. Ct. 84 (1927).
That war does not, of itself, confer A power of sequestration of the
enemies' property, but merely creates such a power in the legislature, is
an established principle of international and American law. At one time
this extended to the power of confiscation, though in modern times con-
fiscation is deemed prohibited. Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch. 110 (U.
S. 1814) ; McVeigh v. Bank, 26 Gratt. 188 (Va. 1875) ; cf. Conrad v. Waples,
96 U. S. 279, 284 (1878) (until a statute provides for sequestration or con-
fiscation, a court cannot validly decree sequestration or confiscation of
property on land. There is no automatic embargo). It would follow that
the instant assignment could hardly be termed an "illegal transaction"
since it occurred before the sequestration act, and' therefore the statute
could have no retroactive effect so as to render such assignment invalid.
The adjudication that the transaction was within the Act as a "trading
with the enemy" is also opposed to the settled usage of international and
Anglo-American law that this phrase contemplates only the trading acres-
the border of belligerent countries. See Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561,
573 (1868). The penal prohibition against "trading with the enemy" was
properly directed only to American citizens or persons in the United States.
It was not directed to foreigners abroad, and it did not purport to prohibit
trading by the enemy before October 6, 1917. When it is further considered
that, by the treaty between Prussia and the United States of 1799, provi-
sion is made for allowing merchants of either country nine months to col-
lect debts, settle their affairs, and withdraw their property in time of war
[2 Malloy, Treaties (1910) 1492], and that by proclamation of February
1917, the President assured the security of German property, it would ap-
pear that the instant decision is of questionable soundness.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-STATUTORY CHANGs IN POSSIBLE US73 OF P.E!-
ISES-SURRENDER-The plaintiff leased to the defendant a three-story non-
fireproof building to be used incidentally as an automobile service station.
The legislature subsequently passed an act providing that no non-fireproof
building used as a service station should be erected to a greater height than
two stories. The building was destroyed by fire. The lease provided that
in case of total destruction of the building no rent should be collected until
the premises were completely rebuilt. The plaintiff offered to erect either
a two or three story non-fireproof building. The defendant replied that it
would pay full rent only for a three story fireproof building. A declara-
tory judgment was entered to the effect that the contract was rescinded
by operation of law. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed on
the ground that the defendant's refusal to accept the plaintiff's proposition,
togethe with the plaintiff's acquiescence in the judgment of the lower
court, ambunted to a surrender by operation of law. Girard Trzs Co. v.
Tremblay Motor Co., 140 Ati. 506 (Pa. 1928).
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In the absence of express agreement a lessor does not warrant that the
leased premises will remain suitable for the purposes for which they are
leased. Federal Metal Bed Co. v. Alpha Sign Co., 289 Pa. 175, 137 Atli
189 (1927); Widmar v. Healey, 247 N. Y. 94, 159 N. E. 874 (1928). When
the principal use for which premises are leased is prohibited by statute,
the duty to pay the full rent is not terminated if any beneficial use remains.
Lawrence v. White, 131 Ga. 840, 63 S. E. 631' (1909) (premises leased
primarily for the sale of liquor); Proprietors Realty Co. v. Wohltmann, 94
N. J. L. 303, 112 Atl. 410 (1921) (same); Imbeschied v. Lerner, 241 Mass.
199, 135 N. E. 219 (1922) (same). Conlra: The Stratford In. v. Scattlo
Brewing and Malting Co., 94 Wash. 125, 162 Paci 31 (1916) (premises
leased for saloon and restaurant purposes). If the statute prohibits
every possible use, the duty to pay rent is extinguished. Greil Bros.
Co. v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So.:876 (1912). Since in the instant case
the use prohibited was at least no more important than the uses still avail-
able,'the conclusion that the lessee would be under a duty to pay full rent
for a building similar to the one destroyed is in accord with the authori-
ties. Since the plaintiff had indicated his willingness to treat the lease
as terminated and since the defendant did not wish to continue the relation
on the only terms possible under the view taken by the court, a desirable
result seems to have been attained in declaring the lease at an end. The
theory of surrender by operation of law most strongly supported is that
it is the nature of an estoppel, the parties having voluntarily placed them-
selves in a position inconsistent with the continuance of the term. 2 Tif-
fany, Landlord and Tenant (1912) 1322-1323; see Kull v. Mastbaum and
Fleisher, 269 Pa. 202, 205, 112 Atl. 631) 632 (1921). Another theory is
that the surrender is found from acts manifesting a mutual intent to ter-
minate the relation. See Banks v. Berliner, 95 N. J. L. 267, 270, 113 Atl.
321, 322 (1921); Chambers Co. v. Trask, 158 N. E. 786, 788 (Mass. 1927).
It may be questioned whether the facts of the instant case satisfy the
technical requirements o6 either theory, but the similarity between this
case and other well recognized examples of surrender by operation of law
would seem sufficiently clear to justify the conclusion.
PERPETUITIES-SUBSTITUTIONARY GiFT OvER AFTER A LIMITATION UPON A
LnFE ESTATE TO GRANDCHILDREN "THEN LrvINc.'-By the third clause of
his will the testator devised the use of certain real estate to his daughter
for life "and at her death [the use] unto my grandchildren [unnamed]
then living-and to the survivors of them." Upon reaching the age of
thirty, each was to receive half of his respective share of the principal
and at the age of fifty the other half, provided: "If any of my said grand-
children die before said distribution leaving children, such children will
take the share that would have been distributed to their parents." Clause
ten provided that the residue of the estate "shall be paid as above stated."
The testator was survived by the daughter and three grandchildren. In a
suit to construe the will held, that upon the testator's death the remainder
vested in the grandchildren as a class, open too admit after-born grand-
children until the period of distribution; and although the gift to children
of an after-born grandchild was void as violating the rule against perpetui-
ties, the rest of the will was valid. Shepard v. Union and Now Haven
Trust Co., 106 Conn. 627, 138 At. 809 (1927).
In absence of a contrary intention the members of a class taking a
remainder limited upon a life estate are ascertained, and the estate vests
upon the death of the testator. Tipton v. Tipton, 1 S. W. (2d) 485 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928); Linseott v. Trowbridge, 224 Mass. 108, 112 N. E. 956
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(1916). But when the limitation upon the life estate is to persons "then
living" the contrary intention is manifested, members of the class are not
ascertained, and the estate does not vest until the death of the life tenant.
Compton v. Rixey, 124 Va. 548, 98 S. E. 651 (1919); Walker v. Wilmazn,
3 S. W. (2d) 303 (Ark. 1928); cf. White v. Smith, 87 Conn. 663, 672, 89
At. 272, 275 (1914). Contra: Harrison, v. Harrison, 213 Ala. 418, 105
So. 179 (1925), criticised in (1925) 24 BIcH. L. REv. 399. Except that
if the members of the class are named it vests in them upon the death of
the testator. Bender v. Bender, 225 Pa. 434, 74 At. 246 (1909). In the
instant ease the intention is confirmed by an express provision that the
grandchildren's income from the estate shall not begin until the death of
their mother. The Connecticut court has been extreme in holding remainders
to be vested. Close v. Benham, 97 Conn. 102, 115 At. 626 (1921); Be!-
ifeld v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 Atl. 585 (1893); criticized in Gray, Ruo
Against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) § 205 b. This has probably bcen due
to the insidious effect of the use of the term "vested contingent remainders."
Johnson v. Edmond, 65 Conn. 492, 33 Atl. 503 (1895); Bartram T. Powell,
88 Conn. 86, 89 Atl. 885 (1914); Gray, op. cit. supra § 118; Cleaveland
et al., Probate Law and Practice in Conn. (1915) § 430. Farzs v.
Farnum, 53 Conn. 261, 2 At. 325 (1885), cited in the instant case for the
proposition that the remainder to the grandchildren vested on the death of
the testator, has been disapproved. Farvum v. Farnm, 83 Conn. 369, 77
At. .70 (1910). If the remainder in the instant case is considered to b3
contingent, it might easily happen that it would vest at the death of the
life tenant only in grandchildren born after the death of the testator.
Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324 (1787); Ward v. Van der Loeff, 131 L. T. R.
292 (H. L. 1924); Gray, op. cit. supra § 215. The conditional limitation
to the issue of such grandchildren is manifestly too remote and the entire
substitutionary gift over apparently should fail. Joe v. Audly, supra; Ward
v. Van der Loeff, supra; cf. Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 298 Mo.
148, 249 S. W. 629 (1923). Had the court so declared in this case, the
fee in the grandchildren would have become absolute upon the death of
the life tenant. White v. Smith, Supra; Note (1925) 38 HARe. L. Rzv.
379. The will then would still have been valid, and the possible future
dilemma of overruling this case, or further confusing of the law on this
subject would have been avoided.
PLEADING-MIISJOINDER-MOTION TO REQUnR ELEcmoN.-The plaintiff
bought a storage battery from a middle man and sustained injury due to
defective manufacture. In an action against the manufacturer for breach
of warranty and negligence, the defendant moved to compel plaintiff to
elect between the two causes of action and serve an amended complaint.
The plaintiff appeals by permission from an order of the Appellate Division,
reversing an order of the Special Term denying the motion. Held, that the
cause for breach of warranty could not be sustained. And since, therefore,
there were not two causes stated between which election could be required;
and since no question of misjoinder essential to the decision had arisen, the
appeal should be dismissed. Turner v. Edison Storage Battcry Co., (N. Y.
Ct. App., Mlay 1, 1928).
A consensus of the cases would seem to indicate substantial unanimity on
the proposition that an ultimate consumer, purchasing through a middle-
man, may not hold the manufacturer on an implied warranty. Welshauerm
v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 Atl. 271 (1910); 1 Williston, Sale3
(2d ed. 1924) § 244. An exception has developed in some jurisdictions as
to inherently dangerous commodities, such as defective foodstuffs. Cce-
Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927) (glas3 in
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soda); Davis v. Van Camp, 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920) (can of
beans). Contra: Birmingham Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So.
64 (1921); cf. 17 A. L. R. 672 (1922) annotation. As pointed out in the
principal case, it is well settled in New York that not even defective food-
stuffs will support such an action. Chysky v. Drake, 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N.
E. 576 (1923) (based on! the absence of privity, between consumer and
producer). With this in view, the court stated that it would not require
an election between "cause of action" (in negligence) and "no cause of
action" (in warranty). But it has been repeatedly declared by the Court
of Appeals that a mere statement of inconsistent alleged causes is sufficient
to bring a complaint within the misjoinder provisions of the Code. Se
Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 247, 111 N. E. 837, 841 (1916) ; Brook v.
Poor, 216 N. Y. 387, 394, 111 N. E. 229, 232 (1915); Witherbeo v. Bowles,
201 N. Y. 427, 433, 95 N. E. 27, 29 (1911). The instant dictum would seem
to limit this rule, refusing to extend it where "no cause of action" is stated.
Cf. Sullivan v. R. R., 61 How. Prac. 490 (N. Y. 1881) (accord). Several
other jurisdictions require that the causes attacked for misjoinder be com-
pletely alleged in order that the defendant's objection may prevail. Bar-
nett v. Ground, 304 Mo. 593, 263 S. W. 836 (1924); White v. White, 132
Wis. 121, 111 N. W. 1116 (1907); Flint v. Hubbard, 16 Colo. App. 464, 66
Pac. 446 (1901). But of. Penter v. Straight, 1 Wash. 365, 25 Pac. 469
(1890) (demurrer will lie for misjoinder even though the second cause is
insufficiently stated). This would seem to be the more desirable handling of
matters which do not go to the merits of the case. It has been suggested
that the most expedient course would be to disregard the defective cause as
surplusage. See Clark, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action (1927)
25 MICH. L. :REv. 393, 416. The holding of the court in dismissing the ap-
peal, while seemingly contrary to the tenor of the decision, is explainable
by the practice of the court in restricting itself to a consideration of the
question certified to it for determination.
. PLEADING AND PRACTICE-SUNDAY TRIAL-WAIVER OF IRREGULARTY.-At
the express request of the parties and pursuant to a written waiver of any
legal irregularity, a hearing before a referee was held on Sunday. From a
decision in favor of the defendant, confirmed by the lower court, plaintiff
appeals on the ground that the hearing was void under § 5 of Judiciary
Law [N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 31, § 5]. Hold, that the pro-
ceeding was void as involving a matter of public policy which could not
be waived. Ruderfcr v. Kuflik, 222 App. Div. 662, 227 N. Y. Supp. 343
(1st Dept. 1928).
Where a matter of "public policy" is concerned it is generally held that
irregularities of a trial may not be waived. Freeman v. United States, 227
Fed. 732 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) (waiver of jury in trial for felony); Wilson
v. State, 153 Tenn. 206, 281 S. W. 151 (1926) (waiver of judge's disqualifi-
cation). Equally well established is the doctrine that a rule of law, statute,
or constitutional provision enacted exclusively for a party's personal benefit
or protection may be waived by him. State v. Woodling, 53 Minn. 142, 54
N. W. 1068 (1893) (waiver of jury in trial for misdemeanor); Tari ',.
State, 159 N. E. 594 (Ohio, 127) (waiver of judge's disqualification al-
lowed). Under the New York law in question, a judgment rendered on
Sunday on a plea of guilty has been held void, based on the common law
rule prohibiting "judicial" acts on Sunday, as distinguished from purely
"ministerial" acts. People v. Ramsey, 128 Misc. 39, 217 N. Y. Supp. 799 (Sup.
Ct. 1926) ; (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 421. Contra: People v. Kaplan, 217
App. Div. 252, 217 N. Y. Supp. 763 (4th Dept. 1926). But in many jurisdic-
tions the scope of "ministerial" acts has been extended under the exception
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permitting acts of "necessity and mercy." De Orozco v. United States, 237
Fed. 1008 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916) (fixing amount of bail bond); Adanu, v. Coo:,
91 Vt. 281, 100 At. 42 (1917) (return and receipt of verdict after Satur-
day midnight). In jurisdictions where the inviolability of Sunday is more
rigidly observed, the tendency is toward a strict interpretation of the Sun-
day Laws prohibiting the exercise of all judicial functions. Weldon v. Cot-
quitt, 62 Ga. 449 (1879) (Sunday trial on plea of guilty); Harrison V. Bay
Shore Development Co., 111 So. 128 (Fla. 1926) (appeal made returnable
on Sunday). This view has been predicated on the preservation of public
health by enforcing Sunday as a day of rest. Moss v. State, 131 Tenn. 94,
173 S. W. 859 (1915) (charging jury on Sunday). The same justification
has been postulated for the contrary tendency in extending the functions of
courts on Sunday, to deal with breaches of the peace. People v. Kramer,
225 Mich. 35, 195 N. W. 802 (1923) (issuing search warrants). To allow
a party, at whose request and for whose benefit the irregularity of Sunday
trial was permitted, subsequently to challenge the legality of such proceed-
ings, has been denounced as a "palpable miscarriage of justice and a mock-
ery of judicial procedure." State v. Foss, 158 La. 471, 104 So. 211 (1925)
(trial on Sunday). In view of the contrasting trends of judicial decisions
toward strict or liberal interpretations of the common law rule, the distinc-
tion between ministerial and judicial acts has become practically indefinable
and public policy a questionable justification. In the instant decision the
tactics of the plaintiff in raising an objection to the proceedings, after an
eaxpress waiver and an unfavorable verdict, are certainly more at variance
with public policy than is the technical irregularity of a judicial hearing
on Sunday.
TRUSTS--EECUTION ox EQUITABLE ESTATE or CESTUI QUE Tausr.-In
accordance with the provisions of a will, certain lands were held in trust
for the testator's ten children, to be equally divided among them when the
youngest attained his majority. An execution was levied on the undivided
one-tenth share of a daughter, A. In a suit for a declaratory judgment
and an injunction restraining the sheriff from further proceedings, a de-
murrer to the plaintiff's petition was sustained. Held, on appeal, that the
judgment be affirmed, on the ground that since A would probably live until
her brother became of age (three and a half years later), her equitable
estate was subject to execution under Kan. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1923) 77-201.
Thompson v. Zurich State Bank, 260 Pac. 658 (Kan. 1927).
The equitable estate of a cestui que trust was not subject to excution at
common law. 2 Freeman, Executiovs (3d ed. 1900) § 187. This rule is
still followed in some states. Peoples' Bank v. Dcwecsc, 144 Ky. 172, 137
S. W. 850 (1911); Rouse v. Rouse, 167 N. C. 208, 83 S. E. 305 (1914);
Feldman v. Preston, 194 Mich. 352, 160 N. W. 655 (1916). In these states
the remedy is a creditor's bill in equity. Feldman v. Preston, supra; People's
Bank v. Deweese, supra. Many states have enacted the provision of §
10 of the Statute of Frauds [29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677)1 by which passive
trusts were deprived of this exemption. Ala. Civ. Code (1923) § 7806;
N. Y. C. P. A. (1924) § 709. Some courts subject the estate of the cestui of
an active trust to execution by interpreting statutes providing that "all prop-
erty real and personal of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, shall be
liable to execution" as referring to equitable as well as legal interests.
Fish v. Fowlie, 58 Cal. 373 (1881); Gordon v. Hilliman, 107 Wash. 490, 182
Pac. 574 (1919). Several jurisdictions, including that of the instant case
have expressly provided for the same result by statute. Neb. Code Civ.
Proc. (1927) § 2455; 2 Mills Colo. Ann. Stat. (Courtright, 1927) § 4163;
Bogert, Trusts (1921) 442, n. 28. In states where spEndthrft trustZ are
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upheld, the enforced intention of the settler, rather than any procedural
difficulty, precludes a levy, Bogert, op. cit. supra at 180-187; (1926) 35
YALE LAW JOURNAL 767. Moreover, an interest which is so indeterminate,
indefinite, or contingent, that it is incapable of being sold with fairness to
both creditor and debtor may not usually be thus levied upon. Smith 1.,
Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149, 41 Atl. 284 (1898) (son's interest contingent on
surviving his mother held too indefinite); Safe Deposit Co. v. ITdepondent
Brewing Ass'n., 127 Md. 463, 96 Atl. 617 (1916) (wife's interest contingent
on her surviving her husband held too uncertain). But the decision in the
instant case is to be approved since it seems desirable that all the assets
of a debtor should be subject to his debts. With the economic value now
attached to expectancies, interests which are only slightly contingent and
problematical, as in the instant case, are properly made subject to execution.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-PRIVILEGE OF MANUFACTURER TO REFUSE TO SELL
To D.ALER-The plaintiff's deceased husband organized a sales corpora-
tion for the exclusive marketing of the defendant's product. The defend-
ant Victor Talking Machine Company urged him to buy up all the shares
of this corporation, threatening to discontinue business if he refused, but
indicating that it would continue to furnish its product if he complied.
After the deceased had secured the shares, the plaintiff as sole legatee and
executrix brought an; action in, tort for damages, alleging that the de-
fendant, attempting to acquire the namd and good will of her business,
which she refused to sell, had ceased furnishing its product and thereby
rendered the shares practically worthless. A demurrer to the complaint
was sustained. Held, on appeal, that the judgment be affirmed on the
ground that the corporation an& not the plaintiff was the proper party
and that furthermore, the defendant's conduct was in nowise tortlous.
Green v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 24 F. (2d) 378 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
The court disposed of the problem on the ground of capacity, but the
dictum that a "mere refusal to sell" is not tortious suggests that the
defendant corporation, after encouraging a retail concern to market its
goods exclusively, may destroy it by withdrawing its business on the plain-
tiff's refusal to sell out. But of. Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream
of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) (same rule applied to achieve
contrary result, i. e., to protect manufacturer from possible absorption by
retailer). This would be particularly harsh under modern methods of sale,
whereby a demand for a specific brand is created. In such a situation,
the retailer may be unable to obtain a contract, in view of the rela-
tive strength of the parties. The courts generally refuse to disregard
the ethical element in business competition and the tendency is to
grant relief. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909)
(banker with sole purpose of ruining a barber set up a competing shop
with cut rates. To designate this as "competition" was considered a "per-
version of terms"); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.
W. 754 (1927) (court weighed the economic status of the parties and In-
sisted on "as high a standard of business morality as prevails among reput-
able business men"); Dunshee v. Standard Oil, 152 Iowa 618, 132 N. W.
371 (1911) (defendant ruined retailer by "simulating" competition. "Com-
petition must be considered in the light of reasonable conduct under all
the circumstances"); Ertz v. Produce Exchange, 79 Minn. 140, 81 N. W.
737 (1900); London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493,
69 N. E. 526 (1903); Schonwald v. Ragains, 32 Okla. 223, 122 Pac. 203
(1912) ; Hughes v. Samuels Brothers, 179 Iowa 1077, 159 N. W. 589 (1016) ;
of. Passaic Print Works v. Ely, 105 Fed. 163 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900) (San-
born, J. dissenting); Westminster Laundry Co. v. Hesse Envelope Co., 174
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Mo. App. 238 (1913); Nat'l Ass'n Window Glass Ifro. 'v. Un tcd States,
263 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 148 (1923). The court distinguished the instant
case in that there was no "affirmative conduct" or "interference with the
ex.pectancy of dealing with third parties," but it is submitted that the
decisions are based on a determination of the reasonableness of the com-
petition. Possibly there were undisclosed factors, such as incapability of
the plaintiff or an attempt to extort an unreasonable price, which would
weaken her case. But it should not follow that large manufacturers may
secure the marketing facilities which they have induced others to develop,
without paying therefor. Cf. (1928) 70 N. Y. L. J. 952.
